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Abstract: During the 1980s and early 90s, interstate natural gas markets in the United States
made a transition away from the regulation that characterized the previous three decades.  With
abundant supplies and plentiful pipeline capacity, a new order emerged in which freer markets
and arbitrage closely linked natural gas price movements throughout the country.  After the mid-
1990s, however, U.S. natural gas markets tightened and some pipelines were pushed to capacity. 
We look for the pricing effects of limited arbitrage through causality testing between prices at
nodes on the U.S. natural gas transportation system and interchange prices at regional nodes on
North American electricity grids.  Our tests do reveal limited arbitrage, which is indicative of
bottlenecks in the U.S. natural gas pipeline system.
1.  Introduction
During the 1980s and early 90s, interstate natural gas markets in the United States made a
gradual transition away from the regulation that had characterized the three previous decades. 
The 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act and subsequent actions by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and the U.S. Congress gradually opened up interstate natural gas pricing to market
forces.  With plentiful pipeline capacity, a surge in natural gas production and growth in
consumption, a new order emerged in which freer markets and arbitrage closely linked
movements in natural gas prices throughout the United States, as De Vany and Walls (1993,
1995, 1999), Doane and Spulber (1994), and MacAvoy (2000) have documented.  Production
varied to meet seasonal changes in demand, and prices did not show much volatility.
U.S. natural gas markets continued to evolve throughout the 1990s.  Natural gas
consumption grew—propelled by the rapid growth of its use in electric power generation, which
was driven by regulatory changes and the emergence of new technology.  As consumption grew,
production and net imports failed to keep pace with the gains in heating season demand (Figure2
1).  Summer production and imports gradually rose to near winter levels, and the market relied
more heavily on storage to meet the seasonal variation in demand.   At the same time, prices
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became more volatile.   Moreover, once pipeline companies were no longer guaranteed a rate of
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return (MacAvoy 2000), their incentives to build the excess capacity necessary to accommodate
rising peak winter usage was reduced.
By 2000, U.S. natural gas markets looked substantially different than they had in the late
1980s.  With the seasonal variation in consumption dependent on inventories rather than changes
in production, prices became more volatile, and according to Brown and Yücel (2007), inventory
swings figured prominently in that volatility.  In addition, as some pipelines were pushed to
capacity, the physical means for arbitrage was limited, and the links between regional natural gas
prices throughout the United States seemingly weakened, as shown by Marmer, et al. (2007).
These changes in market conditions raise a question about how well the pipeline system
supports the arbitrage required to integrate regional natural gas markets in the United States.  To
examine this issue, we use a series of causality tests to assess whether arbitrage between Henry
Hub and two regional nodes on the U.S. natural gas transmission system has become limited. 
The tests involve daily natural gas prices at Henry Hub and two regional nodes on the U.S.
natural gas transmission system, as well as electricity prices at two regional interchange nodes on
the North American electricity grids—with these electricity prices being indicative of regional
demand conditions for natural gas.  Our testing reveals limited arbitrage, which suggests that a
lack of pipeline capacity contributes to the volatility of regional natural gas prices in the United
States.3
2.  Price Shocks and Regional Natural Gas Markets
 To examine how natural gas price shocks are transmitted across the United States and
how fluctuations in regional demand might influence natural gas pricing, we undertake a series of
causality tests involving daily natural gas and electricity prices at major trading nodes for the
period February 3, 1997 through January 17, 2007.  The natural gas prices include those at Henry
Hub, Transco Zone 6 and Topock, and the electricity prices are for PJM and Palo Verde. 
Although regulation may affect the demand and supply conditions at any of these five trading
nodes, the prices at each are set by the interaction of market forces.
Henry Hub can thought of as the principal upstream market for natural gas in the United
States.  Near New Orleans, Henry Hub comprises a series of 16 pipeline interconnects at a single
facility that draw their supplies from the largest concentration of natural gas producing regions in
the country and nearby terminals for importing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).  These pipelines
directly serve markets throughout the U.S. East Coast, the Gulf Coast, the Midwest, and up to the
Canadian border.  Interconnections with pipelines across Texas link the Henry Hub market to
those in the U.S. West.  Serletis and Herbert (1999) find that the Henry Hub spot price is strongly
correlated with the NYMEX futures price, which is the most widely traded natural gas contract in
the world.  As such, the Henry Hub price represents a national market price for natural gas that is
determined relatively close to the wellhead. 
Transco Zone 6 and Topock are two regional trading nodes on the North American
natural gas transmission system downstream from Henry Hub, and their prices represent market
conditions in the U.S. East and U.S. West, respectively.  Transco Zone 6 is a natural gas market
center along 300 miles of pipeline, covering a six-state area from Virginia to New York City. 4
Topock is a regional transportation and pricing node for natural gas on the California-Arizona
border.
In the two regions we examine, considerable natural gas is used to generate electricity. 
Moreover, natural gas is the marginal fuel for generating electricity in both regions (Hartley et al,
2007).  Consequently, fluctuations in electricity prices can be used to examine how changing
regional demand affects the dynamics of U.S. natural gas markets.  Accordingly, we consider the
interchange electricity prices at two major nodes on the North American electricity grid—PJM in
the East and Palo Verde in the West.   PJM is a system of interconnected transmission lines that
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functions as an interchange to supply electric power for Central and Eastern Pennsylvania, nearly
all of New Jersey, Delaware, Western Maryland, and Washington D.C.  Originally developed as
a switch yard for the Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Arizona, Palo Verde is an electricity
transmission interchange that offers direct access to power generation and demand centers
throughout the U.S. Southwest and southern California.  It can also serve markets in the Pacific
Northwest and northern Rockies through interconnecting transmission lines.
2.1  Testing for Arbitrage
We test for causality in two chains of prices.  For the U.S. East, the chain from upstream
to downstream is Henry Hub, Transco Zone 6 and PJM.  In the U.S. West, the chain from
upstream to downstream is Henry Hub, Topock and Palo Verde.  As shown in Figures 2 and 3,
prices in each of the two groupings are likely to show correlation.  The causality tests allow us to
trace price shocks that originate close to natural gas supplies, are transmitted downstream to
regional natural gas markets, and are pushed onward to regional electricity markets.  They also
allow us to investigate whether shocks originating in regional electricity markets are transmitted5
backward to regional natural gas markets and then upstream to Henry Hub.  Taken together, the
causality tests can reveal whether natural gas prices are well arbitraged between Henry Hub and
the two regional trading nodes.  A lack of such arbitrage would imply delivery constraints in the
natural gas pipeline system.
In the absence of delivery constraints, we would not expect variations in regional
conditions (such as regional demand for natural gas to generate electricity) to exert an influence
on regional natural gas prices without also affecting the price at Henry Hub.  Any regional
fluctuation in natural gas demand would be supplied by the national market, and the regional
price fluctuations would be arbitraged back to the Henry Hub price.  With pipelines reaching
capacity or natural gas flows otherwise restricted, arbitrage could be limited.  Regions with
constrained delivery could see natural gas price movements that are independent of those at
Henry Hub.  Such bottlenecks could be the result of physical limitations, regulatory inhibitions,
or monopolization.
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An alternative approach to ours is to test for simple cointegration between upstream and
downstream natural gas prices.  The lack of simple cointegration between natural gas prices
across regions would suggest the possibility of a breakdown in the law of one price brought about
by the lack of arbitrage.  Cointegration testing does not allow for the potential influence of
intervening factors, such as changes in transportation costs, that might affect long-term pricing
relationships without being indicative of a breakdown in arbitrage.  The causality testing we
undertake provides a more comprehensive examination of the transmission of price shocks, and
when it reveals a breakdown in arbitrage, there is greater assurance that such a breakdown has
occurred.
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2.2  About the Data
For purposes of analysis, we use daily data covering the period from February 3, 1997
through January 17, 2007.  These data cover a nearly ten-year period after the seasonality of
production has come to an end and storage is used to meet seasonal swings in demand.  The
period also contains numerous episodes of volatile natural gas and electricity prices.
As the first step in our analysis, we examine the properties of each price series as
represented in natural logs.  The two regional natural gas prices are somewhat more volatile than
the Henry Hub price, although the volatility of the Transco Zone 6 price is lower relative to its
mean (Table 1).  We see more price volatility in the U.S. West, with the electricity price more
volatile than the natural gas price.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reveal that natural gas prices at Henry Hub and Topock
and the electricity price at Palo Verde are difference stationary (Table 2).  Similar testing finds
that the natural gas price at Transco Zone 6 and the electricity price at PJM are trend stationary.
2.3  Cointegration Tests
The finding that the Henry Hub, Topock and Palo Verde prices are difference stationary
raises the possibility that these series may be cointegrated.  Two integrated series are cointegrated
if they move together in the long run.  Cointegration implies a stationary, long-run relationship
between the two difference-stationary series.  As such, the cointegrating term provides
information about the long-run relationship.  If cointegration is not taken into account, the
relationship between the cointegrated variables could be misspecified, and/or parameters could
be inefficiently estimated.
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The Johansen procedure reveals that Henry Hub and Topock prices are trend cointegrated,7
which implies a long-term relationship with a drift (Table 3).  The estimated value of  $ is 1.007,
which indicates that a one-percent change in the Henry Hub price is met with about a one-percent
change in the Topock price and vice-versa.  The adjustment coefficients are -.0140 for Henry
Hub and .0277 for Topock, indicating that the Topock price adjusts to errors in the long-term
relationship between the two prices at about twice the rate that the Henry Hub price adjusts. 
Similar testing finds the electricity price at Palo Verde price is neither cointegrated nor trend
cointegrated with the Henry Hub or Topock natural gas prices at the five-percent level (Table 3).
2.4  Bivariate Models and Estimation Procedures
Causality testing generally requires the use of stationary variables.  Accordingly, our
causality tests use differences of logged prices at Henry Hub, Topock and Palo Verde, and
deviations from trends in the logged prices at Transco Zone 6 and PJM.  Errors in the trend
cointegrating relationship are also used in causality tests involving Henry Hub and Topock prices
together.
We use standard causality testing to examine how price changes are transmitted between
natural gas and electricity pricing nodes.  All tests are conducted with natural logs of the
variables in their stationary form.  For any pair of upstream and downstream prices that do not




tt where  SPD and SPU represent the appropriate stationary form of the downstream and upstream
1 2 1i 2i 1i 2i 1t 2t prices, respectively; a , a , b , b , c  and c  are parameters to be estimated; and :  and :  are
white noise residuals.
Because the Henry Hub and Topock price series are cointegrated, we account for
cointegration in their relationship by specifying a vector error-correction model in which changes
in the dependent variable are expressed as changes in both the independent and the dependent
variable, plus an error-correction term, as recommended by Engle and Granger (1987).  For
cointegrated variables, the error-correction term reflects the deviations from the long-run
cointegrating relationship between the variables.  The coefficient on the equilibrium error reflects
the extent to which the dependent variable adjusts during a given period to deviations from the




34 where the CI is errors in the estimated trend cointegrating relationship (PD-"-$@PU-(t); a , a ,
3i 4i 3i 4i, 34 3 t4 t b ,  b ,  c ,  c   "  and "  are parameters to be estimated; and :  and :  are white noise residuals.  
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34 The coefficients "  and "  represent the adjustment to equilibrium error in the long-term
relationship between the upstream and downstream prices.
For the models that do not contain a cointegrating relationship, causality runs from the9
1i upstream to the downstream price if the b  are jointly significant.  Similarly, causality runs from
2i the downstream price to the upstream price if the b  are jointly significant.  For the error-
3 correction models, causality runs from the upstream price to the downstream price if "  and the
3i b  are jointly significant, and causality runs from the downstream price to the upstream price if
44 i "  and the b  are jointly significant.
2.5  Natural Gas and Electricity Pricing
In examining the transmission of price shocks between Henry Hub and the two regional
natural gas nodes, we find bidirectional causality (Table 4).  Movements in the Henry Hub price
lead movements in Transco Zone 6 and Topock prices.   In addition, movements in the two
8
regional natural gas prices lead those at Henry Hub.
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In both the U.S. East and U.S. West, we find bidirectional causality between regional
natural gas and electricity prices.  Movements in the Transco Zone 6 and Topock prices lead
those of the PJM and Palo Verde prices, respectively.  Similarly, movements in the PJM and Palo
Verde electricity prices lead the natural gas prices in their respective regions.
Such findings are expected because natural gas is the marginal fuel most commonly used
for electricity generation in these two regions.  When a region’s electricity prices are driven up by
strong demand, the demand for natural gas is likely to rise in the region, pulling up its price. 
Similarly, when regional natural gas prices are pushed up by more costly supply, the cost of
electricity generation will rise in the region.
We also find no causality between the Henry Hub natural gas price and regional
electricity prices.  Because regional electricity prices influence natural gas price movements in
their respective regions, the absence of a relationship with the Henry Hub price of natural gas10
suggests the likelihood that regional electricity prices exert an independent influence on regional
natural gas prices that is not arbitraged back to Henry Hub.
3.  Assessing the Influence of Regional Electricity Prices
Multivariate tests provide a means to more throughly assess the possibility that regional
electricity prices exert an independent influence on regional natural gas prices that are are not




where STZ6 is the stationary form of the natural gas price at Transco Zone 6; SHH is the
stationary form of the natural gas price at Henry Hub; SPJM is the stationary form of the
5 6 5i 6i 5i 6i 5i 6i 5t electricity price at PJM; a , a , b , b , c , c , d  and d  are parameters to be estimated; and :
6t and :  are white noise residuals.  Equation 5 can be used determine whether PJM electricity
prices exert an independent influence on Transco Zone 6 natural gas prices when the effects of
Henry Hub prices are taken into account.  Similarly, equation 6 can used to determine whether
the regional electricity prices affect natural gas prices at Henry Hub natural when Transco Zone 6
prices are taken into account.
For the U.S. West market, where Henry Hub and Topock prices are trend cointegrated,11
we specify the following tests:
(7)
(8)
where PT is the price of natural gas at Topock; PHH is the price of natural gas at Henry Hub;
PPV is the price of electricity at Palo Verde; CI is errors in the trend cointegrating relationship
7 8 7i 8i 7i 8i 7i 8i 7 8 between Henry Hub and Topock prices; a , a , b , b , c , c , d , d , "  and "   parameters to be
7t 8t estimated; and :  and :  are white noise residuals.  Equation 7 can be used to determine whether
Palo Verde electricity prices exert an independent influence on Topock natural gas prices when
the effects of Henry Hub prices are taken into account.  Similarly, equation 8 shows can be used
to determine whether regional electricity prices affect natural gas prices at the Henry Hub when
Topock prices are taken into account.
As shown in Table 5, the two pairs of tests provide similar results.  In both regions, the
Henry Hub price has a significant effect on regional natural gas prices.  In addition, each regional
electricity price exerts a significant independent influence on its respective regional natural gas
price.  Natural gas prices in both regions have a significant effect on Henry Hub prices, but
electricity prices in neither region are significant.
Movements in regional natural gas prices are shaped by movements in both Henry Hub
natural gas prices and regional electricity prices.  The influence of regional electricity prices on
regional natural gas prices is not arbitraged back to Henry Hub.  The lack of arbitrage suggests12
constraints in natural gas delivery from Henry Hub to both the U.S. East and U.S. West markets.
4.  Conclusion: Delivery Constraints and U.S. Natural Gas Prices
The agents in the newly deregulated U.S. interstate natural gas market inherited a pipeline
system with a regulatory-era capacity that facilitated relatively free-flowing natural gas and
arbitrage.  As consumption grew, however, capacity along existing lines failed to keep pace
because the new environment didn’t offer the incentives for pipeline companies to build the
capacity necessary to handle rising peak loads.  The result has been bottlenecks and a breakdown
in the pricing conditions once found in the newly freed natural gas market.
Electricity prices in both the East and West markets exert an independent influence on
natural gas prices in their respective regions, but these effects are not arbitraged back to the
natural gas price at Henry Hub.  These findings imply that delivery constraints limit the arbitrage
between regional natural gas markets—with regional prices driven by factors that are
independent of those in play at Henry Hub.
Our findings suggest that an assessment of the market conditions that follow shortly after
a market restructuring should be considered preliminary.  In the wake of restructuring, the
inherited capital stock will reflect the regulatory environment in which it was created, rather than
new market realities.  Over time, the new environment will reshape the capital stock—whether
the changes reflect simple market incentives, new regulatory inhibitions and/or monopolization. 
For natural gas, the result has been the development of bottlenecks in the regional transmission
of natural gas, which seem to have inhibited arbitrage during episodes of peak demand and
reduced the integration of prices across the United States.13
5.  Post Script: Natural Gas Storage
Brown and Yücel (2007) find that storage is an important determinant of the U.S. natural
gas prices.  Natural gas storage might also play role in the relationship between Henry Hub and
regional natural gas prices.  In particular, regional storage can be a substitute for transmission
capacity, and low storage volumes in a given region may be associated with associated with
sharp natural gas price movements during episodes of strong regional demand.  Because storage
data are available only on a weekly basis and for three relatively large geographic regions, we
leave such an investigation for further research.14
References
Brown, Stephen P. A. and Mine K. Yücel (2007), “What Drives Natural Gas Prices?” The
Energy Journal (forthcoming).
Brown, Stephen P. A. and Mine K. Yücel (1993), “The Pricing of Natural Gas in U.S. Markets,”
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Second Quarter): 41-51.
De Vany, A. and W. David Walls (1993).  “Pipeline Access and Market Integration in the 
Natural Gas Industry: Evidence from Cointegration Tests.” Energy Journal 14 (4):1-19
De Vany, Arthur S. and W. David Walls (1995), The Emerging New Order in Natural Gas,
Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut.
De Vany, A. and W. David Walls (1999), “Cointegration Analysis of Spot Electricity Prices: 
Insights on Transmission Efficiency in the Western U.S.”  Energy Economics, 21:435-
448.
Doane, Michael J, and Daniel F. Spulber (1994), “Open Access and the Revolution of the U.S. 
Spot Market for Gas.” Journal of Law and Economics, 37:477-517.
Energy Modeling Forum (2003), Natural Gas, Fuel Diversity and North American Energy
Markets, EMF Report 20, Stanford University (September).
Engle, Robert F. and C. W. J. Granger (1987), “Co-integration and Error Correction:
Representation, Estimation, and Testing,” Econometrica (March): 251-76.
Engle, Robert F. and Byung Sam Yoo (1987), “Forecasting and Testing in Co-integrated
Systems,” Journal of Econometrics, 143-59.
Hartley, Peter, Kenneth Medlock and Jennifer Rosthal (2007), “The Relationship Between Crude
Oil and Natural Gas Prices.” Rice University, Baker Institute Working Paper.
MacAvoy, Paul W. (2000), The Natural Gas Market, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Marmer, Vadim, Dmitry Shapiro and Paul MacAvoy (2007), “Bottlenecks in Regional Markets
for Natural Gas Transmission Services,” Energy Economics 29(1): 37-45 (January).
Natural Gas Regulation Committee (2002), “Report of the Natural Gas Regulation Committee,”
Energy Law Journal 23(1).
Serletis, Apostolos and John Herbert (1999), “The Message in North American Energy Prices.” 
Energy Economics, 21:471-483.
Villar, Jose and Joutz, Fred (2006), “The Relationship Between Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
Prices,” EIA manuscript, October.151617
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
(Logs of Daily Data, February 3, 1997 through January 17, 2007)
Henry Hub
Transco
Zone 6 Topock PJM Palo Verde
Mean 1.3744 1.5152 1.4136 3.6640 3.8263
Median 1.4351 1.5476 1.4940 3.6507 3.7600
Std. Dev. 0.5188 0.5327 0.5641 0.4871 0.6362
Normalized
Std. Dev.
37.75 35.16 39.91 13.29 16.63
Table 2: Unit Root Tests








Henry Hub -1.6340  -2.6514 -12.3499**
 
Transco Zone 6  -2.0612     -3.4487* n/a 
Topock -1.8280 n/a -12.0731**
†
PJM -4.8706** -5.3210** n/a
Palo Verde  -2.3100 n/a -9.4332**
†
, * and ** denote significance at better than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 percent, respectively.   Linear trend is not significant. 
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Table 3 A: Bivariate Johansen Cointegration Tests
(Henry Hub and Topock)
logged
Ho:
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7.053602  

















, * and ** denote significance at better than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 percent, respectively.
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Table 3 B. Bivariate Cointegration Tests
(Henry Hub and Palo Verde)
logged
Ho:


















   (0.17212)







































, * and ** denote significance at better than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 percent, respectively.
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Table 3 C. Bivariate Cointegration Tests
(Topock and Palo Verde)
logged
Ho:




















   (0.12131)







































, * and ** denote significance at better than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 percent, respectively.
+21














Henry Hub .0000** .0000** .2364 .0000**
Transco Zone 6 .0000** .0001** .0007** .0000**
PJM .0000** .0113* .0000** .1346









































Henry Hub .0000** .0000** .4649 .0000**
Topock .0000** .0076** .0001** .0000**
Palo Verde .0000** .0000** .0000** .2165

























Optimal lag length is determined by the Akaike information criterion.   Causality test includes term to account for
†
errors in trend cointegration.  Reported values are joint significance—with  , * and ** denoting significance at better
+
than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 percent, respectively.22
Table 5.  Multivariate Tests for Natural Gas Prices
U.S. East Markets U.S. West Markets













Henry Hub .0000** .0000** .0000** .0000** Henry Hub
Transco Zone 6 .0000** .0000** .0000** .0033*   Topock
PJM .0400* .6344     .0000** .8639     Palo Verde

















Optimal lag length is determined by the Akaike information criterion.  Causality test includes term to account for
†
errors in trend cointegration between Topock and Henry Hub.  Reported values are joint significance—with  , * and
+
** denoting significance at better than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 percent, respectively.23
1.  In the average year, inventories are built during May, June, July, August, September and
October, when U.S. natural gas production and imports typically exceed consumption.  In the
average year, U.S. natural gas consumption exceeds production and imports in November,
December, January, February and March.  During those months, current production, imports and
inventories are used to meet consumption.
2.  Over the period from January 1996 through May 2007, the monthly wellhead price of natural
gas had a normalized standard deviation nearly three times higher than that for the period from
January 1985 through December 1995.
3.  The North American electricity grid is broken up into a number of nearly autonomous regions,
which prevents the direct arbitrage of prices by moving electricity across the continent.
4.  See Natural Gas Regulation Committee (2002). 
5.  A more complete model of natural gas pricing could reveal periods of time in which regional
and Henry Hub prices of natural gas prices move together and periods in which capacity
constraints prevent arbitrage.  If the episodes without arbitrage occur with sufficient frequency,
causality testing will be sufficient to reveal a breakdown in arbitrage.  Such testing will not
identify the specific episodes.
6.  See Engle and Yoo (1987).
7.  If a one-unit change in the upstream price occurs over the long run, it will be met with a $
change in the downstream price over the long run.
8.  The model for Henry Hub and Topock prices yields estimated coefficients on the
cointegrating term of -0.0114 and .0327 for Henry Hub and Topock equations, respectively —
with only the latter coefficient significant at better than 5 percent.
9.  These findings are similar to those of Brown and Yücel (1993), who found that price shocks
transmitted through U.S. natural gas markets could originate either at the wellhead or in those
end-use markets in which extensive fuel-switching is possible.
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